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Practicing Pragmatist-Wittgensteinianism 
Introduction 
Much has been written on the continuities between Wittgenstein’s later work 
and Pragmatism. Much of that writing has argued for there being strong 
continuity. Of those who see such strong continuity there are those who hold 
Wittgenstein to be the pre-eminent—even perhaps the superior—philosopher 
of the Wittgenstein-Pragmatism nexus (e.g. Hilary Putnam), and others who 
see Wittgenstein as simply echoing some of what was said with more 
originality by C.S. Peirce, with the consequent diminution in clarity that 
echoes bring (e.g. W.V.O. Quine). What Quine and Putnam have in common, 
however, is the identification of note-worthy continuity, and in this they are 
far from alone (see James C. Edwards Ethics Without Philosophy, Richard Rorty 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, and many others).  
We don’t necessarily wish to dispute these. However, in a similar 
manner perhaps to with Wittgenstein’s relationship to Freud, there are certain 
often downplayed aspects of the Wittgenstein-Pragmatism nexus that 
considerably complicate the picture of continuity as it is so often presented. 
Indeed, one question to ask is whether the picture can survive—will its hold 
over us remain—once we’ve been furnished with certain reminders; that is to 
say, once we’ve been taught certain differences between Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy and Pragmatism.  
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Back for a moment to Freud. It is now fairly widely accepted that 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy is best understood as therapeutic and in being so is 
indebted to Freud and the therapeutic method he devised. Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy is characterised as therapeutic in that he seeks to engage his 
‘interlocutors’ (the scare-quotes are necessary, for the voices we hear in 
Wittgenstein’s ‘dialogues’ / internal monologues might be representative of 
tendencies of his own, rather than of interlocutors) in dialogue such that he 
might facilitate their realisation that their disquiet stems from unconscious 
attachment to a picture of how things must be. For therapy to be successful, 
the interlocutor must freely come to acknowledge the picture as that which 
constrained their thinking and led to their disquiet. Once the picture has been 
brought to consciousness, it loses its power to effect psychological 
disturbance.  
It is also widely known that Wittgenstein had deep distaste for other 
aspects of Freudian psychoanalysis: his theory of mind, and the scientific 
pretensions Freud had for that. So, there is a widely -acknowledged and -
discussed tension in Wittgenstein’s relationship to Freud and Freudianism: 
Wittgenstein believes the therapeutic method a mark of Freud’s genius and 
constructs his approach to philosophy around that method; (while) he 
believes Freud’s scientistic tendencies disastrous and emblematic of the 
technocratic and scientistic culture of his time (and ours).i In the case of 
Wittgenstein’s relationship to Freud therefore, the relationship is only 
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superficially problematic. On inspection it bears up to scrutiny. For one can 
see the value of the therapeutic method without having to thereby accept 
Freud’s metaphysics of mind and his scientistic presentation of that 
metaphysics. But the cost of accepting this is to accept that the glass –-- of  
Freud’s relation to Wittgenstein ---- is half-empty, as well as half-full: one has 
to be clear about the pretty vast differences between the two, if one is to get 
genuinely clear about the real similarity. The question we shall address in the 
next couple of sections of this paper is whether (or not) much the same is true 
of Wittgenstein in relation to Pragmatism. 
 
Wittgenstein vs. James 
Returning our attention to Wittgenstein’s relationship to Pragmatism, then, 
there is it seems a similar tension in evidence. For while James and Peirce 
seem to anticipate some of what one finds in the later Wittgenstein, one also 
finds Wittgenstein in his writings on the philosophy of psychology discussing 
William James in a seemingly highly-critical manner. Indeed, James is one of 
very few philosophers mentioned by name with any frequency in 
Wittgenstein’s later work, and is so such that his words might form one 
strand—one pole, even—in Wittgenstein’s therapeutic dialectic.ii 
Wittgenstein, therefore, had read James but chose to bring to the fore the 
latter’s psychological writings as in need of therapy rather than to align 
himself with James’ Pragmatism. Put another way: Wittgenstein saw James’s 
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writings on psychology as giving voice to a tendency which was to be 
resisted, combatted. 
There are two (closely-related) questions that might spring forth here.  
1. Might one take Wittgenstein’s remarks on James and treat them 
in isolation from any discussion as to the continuity so 
frequently identified between Wittgenstein and Pragmatism? 
On the one hand, this would be tantamount to saying that there 
is a Pragmatist William James who wrote on philosophy and a 
scientistic William James who wrote on psychology. On the 
other hand, one might rather hold that Wittgenstein radically 
misread those psychological writings of James’s, which 
Wittgenstein weaves into his therapeutic dialogue on the 
philosophy of psychology. Understood this way, James’ 
writings on Psychology are continuous with his Pragmatism, 
only Wittgenstein misunderstood this insomuch as he was 
sympathetic to Pragmatism. We find this latter option very 
implausible; given James’ text and Wittgenstein’s treatment of it, 
there is little scope for even the most revisionist of readings of 
James’ psychological writings here. (In other words: we believe 
Wittgenstein’s criticisms of James to be correct, in their 
fundamentals and in most of their details.)iii So: one is left it 
seems having to try to pry apart James’s Empiricism from his 
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Pragmatism. (We have our doubts as to whether this task can be 
achieved.) 
And  
2. What is distinctly Pragmatic about James’ philosophy and in 
what sense might we see Wittgenstein as inheriting it?iv       
 
James’s writings on psychology are distinguished by their empiricism rather 
than anything distinctively Pragmatic. Is Pragmatism at core empiricist in its 
leanings? There is much evidence to suggest so. Of course this will not come 
as a surprise to many. James and Dewey called themselves radical empiricists. 
So, one might ask, what’s in a name..? 
 
Let us quote a passage from James, which is taken from the opening lecture of 
his series of lectures on Pragmatism, wherein he seeks to explain the 
distinctiveness of the philosophical movement. 
 
You want a system that will combine both…the scientific loyalty to 
facts and willingness to take account of them, the spirit of adaptation 
and accommodation, in short, but also the old confidence in human 
values and the resultant spontaneity, whether of the religious or of the 
romantic type. And this is then your dilemma: you find the two parts 
of your quaesitum hopelessly separated. You find empiricism with 
inhumanism and irreligion; or else you find a rationalistic philosophy 
that indeed may call itself religious, but that keeps out of all definite 
touch with concrete facts and joys and sorrows. 
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James wants to effect rapprochement between the language of empiricism and 
religious and ethical language, that is between what he sees as the respect for 
facts, found in the person of empiricist leanings and the respect for the 
passions, for the integrity of the immaterial found in the religious person. 
These can strike one as laudable aims. They are aims that have appealed to 
many who have become disillusioned with hard-headed (and often hard-
hearted) materialist attitudes and their penetration in to every corner of 
modern life, including philosophy. The penetration can manifest a threat to 
the integrity of ethics, to the integrity of religious views, to the integrity of 
philosophy as a discrete discipline and ultimately to the integrity of that 
which is distinctively human.  
Bells will be ringing for the Wittgensteinian. Should the 
Wittgensteinian allow herself to be summoned by those bells to the church of 
pragmatism? Many have suggested so. Rorty is most prominent in having 
suggested so; Putnam is a little more complicated, but no less prominent;v he 
too does in the end believe that the Wittgensteinian will find a deeply like-
minded ally in the Pragmatists. We remain not so sure. 
 
 What is James advocating here in this quote? To be clear, the point is 
not that James wants to protect Christianity from scientific critique; nor is he 
advocating that Richard Dawkins become a regular recipient of the 
sacrament. Rather he is wanting to say that philosophy should acknowledge 
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the integrity of the different domains, and not fix its gaze on one at the 
expense of the other. What would such a one-sided diet amount to? Well, we 
need not speculate; we have Positivism, which came after James, to remind us 
what the consequences of philosophy fixing its gaze on science can do to the 
status of ethical language. In contemporary guise we have the work of those 
such as Paul E. Griffiths vi who wish to eliminate non-scientific language 
(read: language unsuitable for ‘experimental’ purposes) from the 
psychological lexicon. But should Wittgensteinians be Jamesians (and 
Pragmatists)? We would argue not... so fast. Not that there is no merit in 
James’s desire to effect rapprochement between the empiricist mindset and 
the religious or ethical; more, that simple rapprochement is not what is 
needed here. What is needed is an understanding as to why these world views 
/ mindsets seem to be in conflict; why it is that ethics feels (or is) threatened 
by science, why it is that those of an empiricist bent feel the need to attack 
ethical language or religious language. Such an understanding can only be 
effected by inviting the empiricist (including the empiricist in each and every 
one of us) to the therapy session, not by taking empiricism as it has been 
presented and trying to effect rapprochement between it (as presented by its 
adherents) and ethical or religious language (as presented by its adherents). 
This is one important reason why we are very suspicious of the claim that 
James should be seen as an ally or progenitor of Wittgenstein. 
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For James does not question the underlying drive to ‘imperialism’ 
which is one of the hallmarks of empiricism: its yearning for an all-
encompassing empiricisted universe, where all language is amenable to 
playing an epistemological role, in the narrow empiricist sense of 
‘epistemological’. To be sure, James wants to delimit its imperialist 
tendencies, and thus protect the integrity of ethical and religious discourse, 
but he does not get to the nub of the issue. He does not incline to tackling the 
tendency to imperialism at source. The reason is that for James the 
unacknowledged picture at the heart of empiricism remains unacknowledged 
(in James’s own thinking and writing). Empiricism’s underlying appeal 
remains subterranean and undimmed in James. This was one key reason why 
Wittgenstein wrote so critically about James. 
And it is also why when James writes on matters psychological he 
writes as an empiricist. Here emotions are the experience of sensations or 
bodily changes, rather than the ways of taking the world in all its conceptual 
richness.vii It is these writings of James’s to which Wittgenstein addresses 
himself explicitly in his late manuscripts. James presents us as observers of 
our own inner states, those states—sensations—being the evidence for our 
having such-and-such an emotion. 
There is then in James, and we find this in Peirce and Dewey (and in 
turn in Sellars and Quine and Davidson also), at best a too deferent approach 
to empiricism and at worst an embracing of empiricism aligned with a 
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myopia regarding the problems inherent to it. Pragmatism supposedly 
overcomes the subject-object dichotomy; but, in this connection at least, it 
does so (if at all) only at the unacceptably drastic cost of objectifying – 
thingifying – the inner, the subject, including the lived-body.viii As one sees in 
James’s writing on psychology, there is a remarkably full-blooded embracing 
of empiricism, and to say that the eggshells of this way of thinking are still 
stuck to his attempts to produce a distinct philosophy in Pragmatism would 
be (probably too charitable) a way of capturing our misgivings in a way that 
paraphrases Wittgenstein’s own concerns about some of his own earlier work. 
In short, while we find Pragmatism’s maxim unobjectionable and consonant 
with Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophy, we find the practice of the 
seminal figures in the history of Pragmatism to represent a failure to have 
fully broken free of the empiricist tendencies. Again quoting James, the 
maxim, or principle, is as follows: 
 
A glance at the history of the idea will show you still better what 
pragmatism means. The term is derived from the same Greek word, 
meaning action, from which our words 'practice' and 'practical' come. 
It was first introduced into philosophy by Mr. Charles Peirce in 1878. 
In an article entitled 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear,' in the 'Popular 
Science Monthly' for January of that year. Mr. Peirce, after pointing out 
that our beliefs are really rules for action, said that to develop a 
thought's meaning, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to 
produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance. And the tangible 
fact at the root of all our thought-distinctions, however subtle, is that 
there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible 
difference of practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an 
object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a 
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practical kind the object may involve--what sensations we are to expect 
from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these 
effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our 
conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive 
significance at all. 
 
This clearly has resonance for Wittgensteinians and the prophylactic he 
offered by recommending responding to questions for the meaning of a term 
by looking at the term’s use. But such similarities are superficial when one 
acknowledges the empiricism at the heart of pragmatism (and they are what 
led some Pragmatists, unlike Wittgenstein, toward behaviourism. Quine in 
this regard was only following a path already dangerously indicated by the 
Classical Pragmatists, beginning with Bain and Peirce.). 
 
Wittgenstein vs. Peirce 
Hitherto we have focussed our attentions on William James. What of the other 
two founding figures of pragmatism, Peirce and Dewey? Let us deal with the 
founding figure of Peirce, so prominently mentioned in the quotation above. 
Parallels have been drawn between some of Peirce’s remarks on meaning and 
use and some of Wittgenstein’s; here again it is important to be clear about the 
status of some of the parallels being drawn. H.O. Mounce writes: 
 
It is worth noting that there are striking resemblances between 
Peirce’s theory of the sign and some of the views in Wittgenstein’s later 
work. This is especially evident in the case of Wittgenstein’s celebrated 
argument against the idea of a private language. A private language is 
precisely one in which there is a first sign. Thus Wittgenstein imagines 
that someone gives meaning to a sign ‘S’ simply by associating it with 
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one of his sensations. Thereafter he knows the correct way to take S, by 
recalling the original act of meaning. Here is S is a first sign, since it 
derives its meaning simply from the relation between the individual’s 
mind and its object, being unrelated to any other sign. Now 
Wittgenstein’s criticism of this idea may be expressed in Peirce’s terms 
by saying that meaning is not a dyadic but a triadic relation. On the 
idea of a private language, meaning is two-term. Thus the correct way 
of taking S is determined by a two-term relation in which the sign is 
related directly to an object. For Peirce and Wittgenstein meaning is 
essentially three-term. A term is related to an object only if there is 
already a correct way to take it. And only if there were already a correct 
way to take S could it be related to its object. (Mounce 1997 pp27-28; 
bolding ours)  
 
It might strike some that Mounce has drawn some important parallels here; 
but he does so at great cost to any understanding of Wittgenstein as the 
radical philosopher he is. He attributes to Wittgenstein views and arguments 
and talks of Wittgenstein, along with Peirce, identifying the essence of 
meaning. 
 Let’s take a look at what Wittgenstein actually has to say about 
meaning, in his later work. In the much cited passage 43 from PI Wittgenstein 
writes the following: 
 
For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we 
employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a 
word is its use in the language. 
And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing 
to its bearer. 
 
We have argued elsewhere ix that—rather than selectively interpret this 
passage, by ignoring the modals such as “can” and ignoring the last one-
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sentence paragraph—one should take Wittgenstein at his word. While many 
have been tempted to see the phrasing of this remark as a combination of 
Wittgenstein’s dispensable stylistic ‘tics’ and a definition of meaning, which 
therefore demands that the reader identify and remove the superfluous 
clauses and hedging strategies in order to extract the thesis (‘Meaning is use’), 
we have argued something like the opposite. Wittgenstein is deliberately 
cautious in his wording precisely to guard against reading him as advancing 
the claim or the thesis that meaning is use. 
 Now, historically, there have been two paths proposed by those who 
have rightly resisted what we might call the ‘theoretical selective reading’ of 
this passage—the reading that seeks to overcome the clauses and modal 
operators so as to distil out a theory of meaning. The first of these alternatives 
has it that Wittgenstein identifies or essentially-connects the meaning of a 
word with its use. He does so so as to draw attention to the ‘grammatical 
nexus’ between the use of a word and the meaning of a word, such that if one 
asks for the meaning of a word one is generally satisfied with an account of 
the word’s use. This approach, therefore, reads the phrase “the meaning of a 
word is its use in language” as a ‘grammatical remark’, rather than a 
hypothetical remark or expression of a philosophical theory. This one might 
call for shorthand the Oxford reading, as it emerges in the work of Kenny and 
Hacker, and is defended today by their students. 
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 Both the theoretical reading and the ‘Oxford’ (or ‘grammatical’) 
reading might be treated as support for a reading of Wittgenstein and Peirce 
along the lines that Mounce wishes to read them (though it is debateable 
whether this is really entirely plausible with respect to the ‘grammatical’ 
reading). The reasons are that (as we’ve seen) Mounce wants to claim that 
Wittgenstein’s account of meaning is the same as Peirce’s, for both ‘accounts’ 
are, in Mounce’s words, “essentially three term”. Talking of the essence of 
Wittgenstein’s account of meaning is rendered redundant when one observes 
that nowhere does Wittgenstein offer an account of meaning. Much less does 
he “argue” (Mounce again) for something being considered the “essence” 
(Mounce) of meaning.  
 How then might one (more successfully) read PI 43? Well, we 
recommend one reads it as something akin to a prophylactic: it is offered by 
Wittgenstein as something that might help you when faced with an otherwise 
vexing philosophical question. Consider the following: 
I have suggested substituting for ‘meaning of a word’, ‘use of a 
word’, because use of a word comprises a large part of what is meant by 
‘the meaning of a word’… 
I also suggest examining the correlate expression ‘explanation of 
meaning’. … it is less difficult to describe what we call ‘explanation of 
meaning’ than to explain ‘meaning’. The meaning of a word is 
explained by describing its use. 
It is a queer thing that, considering language as a game, the use 
of a word is internal to the game whereas its meaning seems to point to 
something outside the game. What seems to be indicated is that 
‘meaning’ and ‘use’ are not equatable. But this is misleading.  
(AWL 48 Emboldened emphasis is ours.) 
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In a similar vein, note also:  
 
An answer to the question: ‘What is the meaning of a word?’ 
would be: ‘The meaning is simply what is explained in the explanation 
of the meaning’. This answer makes good sense. For we are less 
tempted to consider the words ‘explanation of the meaning’ with a bias 
than the word ‘meaning’ by itself. Common sense does not run away 
from us as easily when looking at the words ‘explanation of the 
meaning’ as at the sight of the word ‘meaning’. We remember more 
easily how we actually use it. (VoW p. 161. Emboldened emphasis ours) 
 
We suggest that it is an error to read Wittgenstein as offering an “argument” 
for (any kind of theory whatsoever of) meaning, or (further) to be saying 
anything regarding the putative essence of meaning. In these two passages 
we find Wittgenstein writing that he suggests substituting for “meaning of a 
word” “use of a word”. He repeatedly writes “we” and “for us”: “we ask…”, 
“what we call…”; thus he indexes these locutions, these questions and 
conceptions, to ‘us’ and ‘we’, i.e. those who adhere to his conception of 
philosophy, ‘our method’ (cf. DS in VoW p.69). He writes of the meaning of a 
phrase being “characterised by us” (BB p. 65) as the use made of the phrase. 
These locutions fall well short of those which one might honestly characterise 
as indicating identity claims, regarding meaning and use.  
 
The emboldened text in the three quotes (immediately above) should 
indicate that throughout his discussions of meaning Wittgenstein is very 
specifically talking about, and very specifically suggesting, a way of going on 
which will help one avoid confusion. There is something distinctly pragmatic 
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about this - but it is not so in the way Mounce wishes to argue regarding 
Peirce’s theory of the sign. To bring this out, we need to first consider another 
quote from Wittgenstein: 
The meaning of a phrase for us is characterised by the use we 
make of it. The meaning is not a mental accompaniment to the 
expression. Therefore, the phrase “I think I mean something by it”, or 
“I’m sure I mean something by it”, which we so often hear in 
philosophical discussions to justify the use of an expression is for us no 
justification at all. We ask: “What do you mean?”, i.e., “How do you 
use this expression?” If someone taught me the word “bench” and said 
that he sometimes or always put a stroke over it…and that this meant 
something to him, I should say: “I don’t know what sort of idea you 
associate with this stroke, but it doesn’t interest me unless you show 
me that there is a use for the stroke in the kind of calculus in which you 
wish to use the word ‘bench’”.—I want to play chess, and a man gives 
the white king a paper crown, leaving the use of the piece unaltered, 
but telling me that the crown has a meaning to him in the game, which 
he can’t express by rules. I say: “as long as it doesn’t alter the use of 
the piece, it hasn’t what I call meaning”.  (BB p. 65) 
 
As the last sentence here testifies, there is here, as many have noted, a strong 
parallel between Pragmatism and Wittgenstein’s later work. However, as we 
have sought to bring out, one is puzzled if one expects there to be strong 
continuity throughout the writings of the key Pragmatists and Wittgenstein. 
The puzzlement can stem from two sources we have outlined here: 
1. James departs from his own Pragmatist principles in his philosophical 
psychology and in his neutral monist version of empiricism: radical 
empiricism. Therefore, parallels between Wittgenstein and James need 
to accommodate this facet of James’s work by seeing that when James 
appears in Wittgenstein’s writings he does so as a voice in a 
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therapeutic dialogue, a voice in need of change or reflection. In other 
words, Wittgenstein sees James as highly-subject to metaphysical 
yearnings and in need of therapy. What we have suggested here 
however is that it is not that James’ radical empiricism and his 
empiricist philosophical psychology are anomalous with respect to his 
Pragmatist principles but that the seeds of these views can be found in 
the way he lays out his Pragmatist principles. He is, crucially, too 
‘respectful’ – too inheritative - of empiricism. In this sense one might 
say either that Wittgenstein completes the Pragmatist project or that 
Pragmatism was a stage in a dialectic which Wittgenstein brings to 
synthesis. 
2. Failure to grasp in full the nature of Wittgenstein’s radical approach to 
philosophy: his metaphilosophy. Failure to see the therapeutic nature 
of Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophy leads one mistakenly to draw 
parallels at the level of substantive accounts or arguments. This is 
mistaken because in a significant sense there are no accounts or 
arguments in Wittgenstein’s work. He does not offer an account of 
meaning, rather he suggests to us a way of seeing meaning which might 
help us when faced with philosophical problems which are generated 
from certain pictures of the meaning of meaning. Thus, even where 
Pragmatism and Wittgenstein seem most similar, there remains a 
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crucial difference in conception. Again, we think Pragmatism can learn 
from Wittgenstein here. 
 
How to write most authentically about Pragmatism and Wittgenstein? 
So far, we have chiefly accentuated the negative. The glass is half empty. By 
our lights, there are significant—founding—strands in Pragmatism that are 
signally inferior to what we find in and is Wittgenstein’s philosophy. But, as 
we mentioned at the outset of this essay, the glass has often been described 
also as being half-full; and we don’t necessarily want to deny this. There are 
significant strands in Pragmatism that make it possible and fruitful to be a 
‘Pragmatist-Wittgensteinian’. We cite in the next footnote the works that we 
think best accentuate the positive: x. 
 Shall we try to triangulate the evidence? Shall we go through this mini-
‘literature’, and come up with an overall verdict on that old and new 
question, ‘Was Wittgenstein a Pragmatist?’? Shall we marshall and debate 
Wittgenstein’s own (few) remarks on the topic? Shall we seek to determine 
once and for all whether this glass is half-empty or half-full? 
 Partly for philosophical reasons that we will elaborate on in a moment, 
we would rather leave any verdiction that may be called for hereabouts to the 
reader. We do not choose here to rehearse the reasons for thinking that the 
glass is after all half-full: we believe that they have, as we’ve said and 
referenced, been given at enough length by others before us. What we want to 
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do in the remainder of this piece, instead, is this: to write something that, 
rather than telling the reader ‘what’ Wittgenstein said and ‘what’ the 
Pragmatists said and where and how they most productively overlap, might 
actually take the debate on the possibility of ‘Pragmatist-
Wittgensteinianism’—and, more important, philosophy itself—and, more 
important, human life—forward, by doing rather than saying (Or by, if you 
like, showing rather than saying). In other words: once one has acknowledged 
the real tensions between Wittgenstein and Pragmatism (which we have spent 
most of the essay thus far setting out), then we think the best thing to do is to 
set out how (rather than what) there can after all be something genuinely 
important saving in the practice of their confluence. 
 
For, after all: How can one write most authentically on the Wittgenstein-
Pragmatism nexus? To set out the things that they agree on would 
presuppose that they have opinions, views, positions, in the ordinary sense 
presumed and purveyed by most philosophers. But—at least for those of us 
wanting to take seriously that Wittgenstein was a ‘therapeutic’ thinker,xi who 
held philosophy to be an activity rather than a body of views or accounts no 
matter of what kind,xii and who had no opinions qua philosopher xiii; and 
wanting to take seriously that (as remarked above) Pragmatism—at least at its 
best—is a philosophy of and in practice, holding that beliefs are nothing other 
than the practices that they are embodied in,xiv and that the speculative and 
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spectatorial quest for certainty xv that previous philosophy has mostly been is 
forever beside the point—that would be an approach that by definition failed. 
We want now to try to take Pragmatism at its best, rather than accentuating 
the negative. We want in what follows to try to bring Pragmatism’s 
metaphilosophy / methodology closer to Wittgenstein’s (perhaps kicking and 
screaming? No matter). Our submission in fact is that one cannot, in the final 
analysis, write truly authentically on the Wittgenstein-Pragmatism nexus 
(taking Pragmatism, at its best, as not having to be simply subject to 
Wittgenstein’s superiority and improvement-upon) except by writing 
authentically as a Pragmatist-Wittgensteinian, or at least by seeking to do so 
and to understand what it really means to do so.xvi Writing, that is, in such a 
way as to take seriously the conception of philosophy that is actually 
present—manifest—in Wittgenstein’s philosophical activity, and in that of the 
best of Pragmatism, in Pragmatism once its (above-adumbrated) scientistic 
weaknesses have perhaps been overcome or dropped. 
 
The philosopher who has done the most to combine Pragmatism and 
Wittgenstein is, as we mentioned at the outset, Hilary Putnam.xvii Putnam is 
the best source for any conventional attempt to write accentuating-the-
positive-ly on the Wittgenstein-Pragmatism nexus. But that isn’t the most 
important thing that Putnam does, to bring Wittgenstein and Pragmatism 
together. No; the most important thing that Putnam does, in this regard, is to 
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do philosophy as a Pragmatist-Wittgensteinian—it was of course he who coined 
this term. In other words: to seek to practice the bringing together of 
Pragmatism and Wittgenstein, not merely to preach it. To produce a pragma 
here, and a use—not merely a meta-discourse.  
As Wittgenstein remarked: “Words are deeds”. We do not wish to 
produce a position-statement, a set of theses about ‘Pragmatist-
Wittgensteinian philosophy’. We want to do some work. 
 
In the remainder of this paper, then, we aim then to follow Putnam’s lead 
beyond where he has gone. We suggest that ultimately the only serious and 
worthwhile way in which to write on Wittgenstein-and-Pragmatism now is to 
move beyond the half-empty / half-full debate, and instead to (try to) do some 
philosophy genuinely in their spirit. Such philosophising, if it succeeds, will 
show/practice the Wittgenstein-Pragmatism nexus far better than it could ever 
be said.xviii 
___________________________________________________________________ 
The paper that we shall in fact take as our jumping-off-point in this enterprise 
is a perhaps-surprising one. It is a paper which might seem at first to have 
nothing to do with Wittgenstein or Pragmatism (let alone the two together) at 
all. We chose it, in part, precisely to show how very wide is the applicability 
of ‘Pragmatist-Wittgensteinian’ thinking. The paper in question is by Jerry 
Williams and Shaun Parkman, and its title is “On humans and environment: 
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The role of consciousness in environmental problems”.xix The paper uses “a 
framework derived from Schutzian phenomenology” (p.449) to explore some 
deep reasons why human beings create environmental problems – and to 
explore how these problems might be effectively addressed in a way that 
works with rather than against the grain of human consciousness and living. 
 
Our primary intention, in the remainder of the present paper, is to explore 
what is right/helpful in the approach adopted by Williams and Parkman, and 
some of what is wrong with it, as would-be Pragmatist-Wittgensteinians. We 
aim to set out and to correct Williams and Parkman by extending their 
thinking in directions suggested, we believe, both by Wittgenstein and by 
Pragmatism at its best. We aim, in the process, to set out and exemplify how a 
Pragmatist-Wittgensteinian approach to philosophy—a resolutely xx non-
theoretical effort to take practice seriously—can help one to think 
therapeutically about our society and our environment and to clear the 
ground for pragmatic interventions therein that could actually work to heal it. 
In other words, our aim is to do no less than to think with you a solution to 
the central problem of our time: our (humans’) fairly-rapid and seemingly-
inexorable collective destruction of our collective life-support mechanism. We 
think that Pragmatist-Wittgensteinianism will have more than earnt its crust, 
if it can help to do this. And we think it can. If we are right, then this such 
would certainly deserve the Rortian honorific term, “edifying philosophy”. 
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Wittgenstein-and-Pragmatism in practice: Everyday environmentalists  
 
Williams and Parkman argue that “human consciousness is characterized by a 
dialectic of environmental destruction. On the one hand, enabled by 
consciousness and scientific rationality, humans produce and externalise their 
being into the world thus creating environmental damage, yet on the other 
hand consciousness provides a risk of anomie so great that humans must 
internalise the social order and thereby make it taken-for-granted and a 
matter of common sense. Environmental destruction, then, finds its 
foundation in our very being.” (p.449)  This we think is a helpful if 
desperately-concise summary. The point about internalising the social order is 
particularly important: it suggests a basis for a necessarily political aspect in 
how one sees society, whether phenomenologically or through another 
philosophical lens. There will be an unavoidable need in one way or another 
successfully to ‘bracket’ the taken-for-granted societal ideology, if one wants 
to achieve liberation from the built-in tendency to environmental damage 
indexed in this quotation. Liberal individualism, capitalist growthism—we 
need to find a way to make figural such implicit nativised ideologies, and not 
allow them simply to be the assumed ground of our existence, if we want that 
existence to continue, to be able to be sustained. (For these failing ideologies 
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and their associated naturalised-Newspeaks are the tacit metaphysics of our 
age.) 
 
How is this to be done? Williams and Parkman claim: “To solve large-scale 
environmental problems we must transcend everyday thinking and the 
discourse of ideas. Effective solutions to environmental problems cannot be 
based in idealism; rather, they must be framed in very pragmatic ways—in 
terms of consequences and actions.” (p.456) xxi 
 
Is this right? It is surely right that, to solve the kind of environmental 
problems that are assailing the world today, business-as-usual thinking 
cannot be merely tweaked. The current everyday ideologies (the very 
widespread assumption that growth is good; the ideology of ‘development’, 
etc) need to be transcended. A transformed thinking needs to become 
common-sensical. But, the Wittgensteinian in us protests that this change is 
not well-characterised simply as the transcending of “everyday thinking”. 
What is required rather is to find a way of turning everyday thinking into 
naturally-environmental thinking (and to preserve some capacity for thinking 
outside either of these ‘boxes’, the mainstream one or the environmental one; 
for such thinking will surely be needed again). The agenda then, surely, has to 
be one of creating a society of everyday environmentalists.xxii This process, so far 
as it concerns language, will begin with ‘watering the seeds’ of such thinking 
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in our language as we already find it: to give a very simple example, in the 
case of a catch-phrase such as ‘Waste not, want not’; and in the very idea of 
‘waste’ as something… wasteful, to be minimised (and, ultimately, one might 
even say, absurd. Nothing can be wasted, in a society that wishes to survive 
indefinitely in a finite world.xxiii). Of course, the process will have to concern 
myriad practical actions in the world too, with which our words inter-leave: 
such as the practice of getting to know our waste better, and finding 
endlessly-better ways of using it or of reducing it. 
 
We need to bring a whole set of words back from their tacitly-metaphysical 
use (in which growth can be infinite, ‘development’ means industrialisation, 
‘rubbish’ is thrown ‘away’ and not seen rather as resources, etc. etc.) to their 
(old-and-new) everyday use.xxiv How exactly is this to be done? 
 
The attack on ‘idealism’ xxv in Williams and Parkman is surely on roughly the 
right track, in terms of explaining how it won’t successfully be done. It is quite 
hopeless—hopelessly ‘idealist(-ic)’, hopelessly rationalistic—to simply tell 
people the facts about looming environmental catastrophe and expect them to 
respond rationally and problem-solve the coming catastrophe away. It is 
hopeless to adopt any strategem which relies centrally only upon changing 
individual ‘hearts and minds’, not collective practices and ‘language-
games’.xxvi Furthermore, as Williams and Parkman rightly put it, “Effective 
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solutions to environmental problems…must be framed in very pragmatic 
ways—in terms of consequences and actions.” Yes; without pragmatism, here, 
we are lost; provided that the deep ‘framing’ of such problems is alive to life. 
That is to say: environmental pragmatism is entirely appropriate, on the back of 
a profound commitment both linguistic, practical etc. to seeing ourselves as 
part of our ecosystem, etc. .xxvii That is to say, once again: We need to forge a 
new everyday thinking. An environmentalist (better still: an eco-logical) 
everyday thinking. 
 
Read (2004) argues that the deep affinity between Dewey and Wittgenstein in 
respect of their being ‘deflationary naturalists’ xxviii and ‘cultural naturalists’ xxix 
is best taken now and extended in the direction of … ‘environmentalism’.xxx 
That is to say, that we best understand ourselves as throughandthrough 
naturally cultural animals, if we understand our coping with the world, our 
being ‘internally-related’ xxxi to it rather than spectators of it, our being 
always-already doers, through the lens of environmentalism (or, better still, 
ecologism). We are part of our ecosystem, xxxii and this is of great philosophical 
and ethical and political meaning. 
 
It can seem shocking to suggest that the James, Dewey and Wittgenstein be 
cast as (everyday) environmentalists. For we are accustomed to thinking of 
‘environmentalism’ as a political category, and of philosophers as above 
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politics. This widespread notion is however multiply flawed. Firstly, the 
whole point of the argument indexed in the previous paragraph is that one 
cannot make any sense of supposing creatures such as ourselves to exist 
except as utterly dependent upon and in an important sense therefore utterly 
immersed in our environing circumstances. Secondly, the merest common-
sense for the species, of survival, ought to make environmentalism, i.e. the 
sense that everyone is ‘downstream’ of everyone else, into something that is 
genuinely basic for all politics, rather than being politically controversial. It is 
their not yet being common-sensical that makes things appear ‘political’ in 
some problematic and controversial way; what is needed is a politics that 
successfully acts so as to render the ideology of ecologism, an Earth-based 
ideology, part of the ground, rather than figural. Thirdly, given that our 
societies are so tragically far from such far-sightedness, there is no way that 
being ‘politically controversial’ can be avoided—in making the transition to a 
thinking and a conducting of ourselves as if tomorrow truly mattered. And 
fourthly, it is in any case misguided to fantasise philosophy as would-be 
politically-neutral.xxxiii This fantasy, fairly widespread in the English-speaking 
world, but much less attractive on the Continent (and of course directly 
contested in Dewey’s corpus, and also in Cornel West xxxiv), is based upon a 
resistance to thinking deeply about the ‘therapy’ that our culture needs to go 
through, the changes that are required if it is to be truly assertible that we love 
wisdom and act accordingly. The drive toward depoliticisation of as much as 
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possible is itself an aspect of the ‘liberal’ philosophy of mutual indifference 
that precisely requires challenging, if these changes are to occur. 
 
Still, it might seem ahistorical or anachronistic to take Wittgenstein and the 
Pragmatists in the way we are suggesting. Doesn’t Dewey for instance rely on 
a Baconian (instrumentalist, dangerously hyper-‘disenchanted’) starting-point 
in much of his philosophising? xxxv To some extent, yes. But what the present 
essay has become (about), as explained above, is not a scholarly effort to 
establish with historical validity exactly where these thinkers stood at the 
time on the philosophical issues of their time. (We have already made clear 
that we regard Classical Pragmatism as multiply flawed, in this connection.) It 
is primarily rather an attempt to understand what it could mean now to be a 
Pragmatist-Wittgensteinian. The Owl of Minerva may indeed have long flown 
for certain of Dewey’s more Baconian (nature-cutting) formulations; we think 
it certainly has. But we think that the confluence of a Pragmatism and 
Wittgensteinianism for our time can nevertheless be very fertile. The test of a 
philosophical approach is what it can offer living philosophy, and (more 
broadly) living. That is what we are attempting to prove, to test, now. 
 
Williams and Parkman remark that “The idealism of modern environmental 
discourse holds little promise for the remediation of large-scale 
environmental problems.” (p.456). This is true, inasmuch as such discourse 
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often simply abstracts from or ignores or speaks down to the everyday lived 
experience of many people, at least in the West / North of the world, which is 
mostly felt in everyday life as relatively unaffected by environmental 
impoverishment, let alone catastrophe (Crisis? What crisis?).xxxvi Furthermore, 
the danger of such discourse is that it frequently abstracts from our lived 
embeddedness in the world, and so can too-easily sucker us into a search for 
techno-fixes and other sticking-plaster-solutions to what are deep problems of 
consciousness and way of life. For we are (or: need to be) looking for a 
practicable way of living that is cotenable with such living continuing, and 
with a sufficient valuing of life (not just one’s own) that will enable this.xxxvii If 
we fail to act on the (Pragmatist-Wittgensteinian) truth of our co-constitution 
with the world, if we fantasise ourselves as outsiders to that world, if we 
fantasise ourselves as quintessentially thinking or gazing individuals (as so 
much philosophy has done), then we will aim, hopelessly and disastrously, to 
intervene in the world as if from the outside, crudely and without awareness of 
the full complexity and subtlety of the system ‘into’ which we are intervening. 
 
And Williams and Parkman rightly point up (p.455, p.457) the dangerous 
tendency for intellectuals to overly assume that explicit thinking, theoretical 
insight etc. is a potent influence upon society, when typically it is quite 
marginal (much as one might regret that fact). It is the philosopher’s 
deformation professionelle to believe that he (it is still usually a ‘he’) is a figure 
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who ought to be and surely will be listened to, in the society in question. The 
role of explicit theory / metaphysics is played up, in the course of such belief; 
our practical engagement in the world and the assumed linguistic and 
psychological tools that constrain and enable that engagement are played 
down. …Pragmatist-Wittgensteinian thinkers stand this appealing misconception on 
its head. We place the deed first; we return over and over to actual practice. 
Thus Wittgenstein famously agreed with Goethe’s remark that “In the 
beginning was the deed”, and, once more, ‘Pragmatism’ as a term comes of 
course from the Greek word, “pragma”, meaning: deed. (And thus our title: 
for, in point of fact, how could one really think Wittgenstein-and-Pragmatism 
at all, except in practice?) 
 
But then doesn’t that, even if it is more realistic than one or another ‘idealist’ 
fantasy, leave us simply having to accept our impotence? Take one of 
Williams and Parkman’s central two recommendations, on how we ought to 
intervene so as to create an effective environmentalism: 
[L]arge-scale environmental problems like global warming can 
be translated into immediate consequences…by addressing them at 
their foundation, the consumptive behaviour of individuals. …[F]or 
example…the cost of fossil fuel paid by Americans only represent[s] a 
small share of their actual cost when scarcity and environmental 
damage are considered… If those who use fossil fuels were to pay the 
true cost (enabled by green taxes), consumptive behaviour would 
change as a matter of economic necessity. Suggestions that urban 
commuters should pay a “commuting tax” to account for their 
consumptive behaviour is also an example of a pragmatic, consequence 
driven mechanism of environmental change… In these cases change 
 30 
occurs when consequences accrue, and consequences accrue when they 
are linked to our consumptive behaviour, behaviours such as buying 
gasoline and commuting by automobile. (p.458) 
 
All true enough; but now who is being idealist? Williams and Parkman are; 
for they have merely pushed the problem back one stage, but have not 
acknowledged this. For how do we generate the political willpower to put 
policy instruments such as these into place? How is a democracy (a society in 
which the people genuinely rule)—or even a command society (for 
commands are useless unless they are obeyed)—to summon the will to put in 
place measures in response to what Williams and Parkman have themselves 
pointed up as the still rather abstract nature of the threat, and given that a 
society built around the needs of the motor-car now seems normal and “just 
how it is”? (p.454) 
 
To a Pragmatist-Wittgensteinian, it is obvious (as it should be to all—but 
philosophers often have to re-learn what is obviousxxxviii) that we have to have 
in mind (and be able to communicate) a workable way to get from here to 
there. Thus there is a pressing need for a movement (more likely: a movement 
of movements) that will take actions that will help to make the new world 
seem possible, and will help to make the new world be actual. For example: 
using and strengthening and lobbying for alternatives to the motor car, and 
starting to make these the norm, the taken-for-granted, the everyday. This 
 31 
will require vast alterations in everything from our planning system to our 
cultural icons. The needful change in consciousness to motivate and then to 
constitute this must itself be fostered, and pursued at first on fertile ground. 
Just as Marx looked for the class that would be best-placed to see reality and 
to fight for a future in which that reality would be different, so must we. One 
such ‘class’ is perhaps parents and children – for it is children upon which the 
burdens of an environmentally-wrecked future will fall hardest.  
 
This movement of movements is to some extent in existence, already.xxxix What 
the Pragmatist-Wittgensteinian can do, as more or less what Foucault called a 
‘specific intellectual’, is to work with it, and help it flourish and avoid the 
many pitfalls (intellectual and otherwise) inevitably close to any 
transformative project. This is neither ‘idealism’ nor philistinism; it is a bold, 
but realistic, and pragmatic approach.xl It is, we believe, true philo-sophy, 
today. 
 
Language and practice can be transformed from within. To create the new out 
of the old, we will need to work relentlessly to expand the ‘vanguard’ of those 
whose consciousness is already raised, to use linguistic reframing xli and ‘non-
linguistic’ xlii tools and strategems to change the everyday into an eco-logical 
everyday; in sum, to start to make commonsense compatible with continued 
existence. 
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This will be a vastly difficult enterprise, in part for the reasons explored by 
Williams and Parkman. But we have the right to believe that it can be done; 
this is what is implicit in James’s great paper “The will to believe”.xliii The 
need of others (and of ourselves) for us to do this, to believe (and then to act), 
is internally related to our human – individual and social - power to make 
things possible (by virtue of believing that they are / can become possible) 
that would otherwise not be possible.xliv James, like Wittgenstein, is 
philosophically revolutionary in considering philosophical issues throughout 
from the point of view of the agent(s).xlv Such agent-centred thinking is why the 
philosophies it co-constitutes are not in the end statable as doctrines or theses 
– it is itself a central reason why we are taking the approach that we are in 
this essay. Of not trying (pointlessly, even counter-productively) to say what 
Wittgenstein and Pragmatism say, but rather, doing.xlvi And our point now is: 
what needs to be done, in order to engender the transformations of discourse 
and action that becoming a society of everyday environmentalists will entail, 
crucially requires just this same sense of (collective) agent-centredness. A 
greater sense of possibility than is delivered in the pessimism of Williams and 
Parkman, and of so much of the present scientistic, techno-fixing, 
consumeristic world-view, which encourages people to innoculate themselves 
against the hope that real change could come. The antidote to (self-fulfilling) 
pessimism concerning the likelihood that we can collectively make the 
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changes that truly becoming an everyday-environmentalist culture will entail, 
in other words, can in part be found precisely in being inspired by the agent-
centred philosophical thinking of the likes of James and Wittgenstein. We can 
individually and collectively become autonomous with regard to norms of 
waste, mutual indifference, short-sightedness of our temporal horizons etc, 
through following the example of liberation offered in Wittgenstein’s thought 
and of hope offered in James’s, against the background of the understanding 
of ourselves as thoroughly inter-dependent and environed that is so 
prominent throughout Wittgenstein and Dewey. If we intelligently look for 
allies and ‘classes’ for which such thinking should make sense, if we work to 
expand the ‘vanguard’ of those who see the coming cataclysm with open eyes 
and open hearts, then the job can be done. 
 
This paper in itself – the writing on these pages - could not possibly be 
enough, however brilliant it was (is) and however widely read it might be. It 
needs to be ‘completed’-- by you, and by many more. In part, in action, 
including in actions that we do not anticipate and perhaps would not in some 
cases even welcome. For Wittgenstein, the deepest meaning of philosophy 
being a ‘therapeutic’ enterprise is that the reader / the listener needs truly to 
enter into the conversation. You need to recognise yourself in all this; to assess 
as you go along your resistances to it and its ‘cathexes’ for and with you. This 
isn’t in the end about us addressing you, the reader; it is about you actually 
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experiencing what we are ‘talking about’ this in the paper. Philosophy is an 
activity – philosophy that is written down is only philosophy waiting to be 
read and resisted and welcomed and reworked. Reconstructed, renewed. 
Similarly, the deepest meaning of the agent-centredness and action-
centredness (rather than being spectatorial or theoryist) of Pragmatist 
philosophising is that the deed that is done here depends in part on – is to 
some degree perhaps even constituted by - the deeds that are done in response 
to it. Beginning with the reader’s commitment to the ‘proposals’ presented 
here; proposals, initially drawn from our reading of Williams and Parkman, 
concerning the need to remould our everyday worlds of expectation, action, 
norm and emotionality. We submit that the way that we (humans) take the 
world needs to change – now it is over to you (to us collectively), to think-
and-feel this through, and then perhaps to undertake a segment of that re-
taking.  
By our lights, a work of philosophy, like a work of art, aims to be a 
therapeutic work, and this means that it speaks with rather than at the reader. 
If it speaks to the reader, then that is because the reader finds herself in it. All 
true philosophy is a deed, a pragma; but the deed is not the author’s (or the 
authors’) alone.  
 
Anthropogenic global warming as a diffuse object 
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So how might this look. One of the problems with motivating ourselves (as a 
society, as a species) to make the changes required to mitigate or prevent 
climate catastrophe, changes such as the radical change in our cultures 
required to move to a low carbon or carbon free economy, is that the problem 
of anthropogenic climate change is so diffuse. There is no clear object for us to 
fear, and fear needs an object. Therefore, even for those who understand the 
threat posed by anthropogenic climate change the understanding stays at 
what one might call an unfelt level. Put another way, fear of a threat to one’s 
existence is a characteristically emotional response. We round the corner 
while walking in the Pyrenees and are confronted by a bear, and our 
instinctual fear brings about or is an emotional response. How one 
characterises this emotional response, explains it, has been the subject of 
much discussion. A discussion in which James played a hugely influential 
role. Contemporary philosophy of emotions can usefully be seen as divided 
into two campsxlvii. In one camp are the Jamesians (or neo-Jamesians) and in 
the other the cognitivists (or judgementalists).xlviii The term “cognitivism” 
brings together writers on emotions, some of whom might be termed pure 
cognitivists: e.g. Sartre, Solomon (1976 & 2003c), Taylor (1985) and Nussbaum 
(2004); and some of whom might be termed hybrid cognitivists: e.g. Goldie 
(2000) Greenspan (1993) Nash (1987) and Stocker (1987). (Roughly: ‘pure’ 
cognitivists believe that emotions are beliefs; while ‘hybrid’ cognitivists 
believe that they are belief/bodily-feeling admixtures, and that beliefs etc. 
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alone are not enough to explain them. ‘Hybrid’ cognitivists thus can easily 
appear the sensible ‘middle-ground’ between the ‘excesses’ of a James or a 
Sartre. But our thought here is that Jamesianism (and Cognitivism) need to be 
brought into the thereapy session; not just ‘happily’ / ‘merrily’ melded 
together.) 
What of those who build upon James’s groundbreaking work? The 
neo-Jamesian camp comprises philosophers and psychologists who advance a 
contemporary variant of James’s account of emotion and in doing so often 
align themselves with the research program initiated by Darwin ([1872] 1965) 
and later Ekman (1972); those Darwinian claims are often supported by 
theoretical claims drawn from neuroscience and cognate theories of mind: e.g. 
Damasio (1994), Prinz (2004) and Robinson (1995). 
In short, cognitivists take emotions to be centrally, and explain them in 
terms of, appraisals, judgements or evaluative beliefs; neo-Jamesians explain 
emotions in terms of awareness of bodily changes, usually patterned changes 
in the Autonomic Nervous System (ANS).  How the debate is polarised can be 
captured by returning to a passage from William James’s paper in Mind, 
published in 1884, a passage frequently quoted and/or referred to by those on 
either side of the debate.xlix  
Our natural way of thinking about … emotions is that the 
mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the 
emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily 
expression. My thesis on the contrary is that the bodily changes follow 
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directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same 
changes as they occur IS the emotion.l  
(James, 1884: 190-191. Emphasis in original) 
 
This is of course James in Empiricist mode ‘rather than’ Pragmatist. However, 
we will not dwell further on this kind of point here; we dwelt on it plenty 
earlier in our essay. Rather we wish to show how a Pragmatist-
Wittgensteinian (or better, Wittgensteinian-Pragmatist?) approach to this 
debate might help and in turn through light on bringing about genuine 
change. 
 On a (neo-)Jamesian account one might characterise the fundamental 
problem facing humanity today thus: the threat posed by anthropogenic 
global warming (AGW) and explained to us by climate science via various 
media just does not provide the environmental triggers so that our 
physiological response (sensations, changes in the ANS) might be triggered 
and which emotional responses on a Jamesian account are the awareness of. 
Now, if one takes a purely Jamesian approach hereabouts, then there is 
nothing we can do about this but wait until there is an event of such 
magnitude and which is unequivocally climate-change related which will 
serve as an environmental trigger (Or we can try to mimic such an event by 
means of scaring people witless via artistic renditions of possible futures, 
etc.). Now the problem with such a sit-and-wait approach is that once waiting 
for such an event might be to wait until it is too late (to prevent fatal runaway 
over-heating). 
 On the cognitivist account it seems difficult to make sense of our 
inaction. The science is unequivocal, the precautionary principle invokes 
rational grounds for acting now, yet we are simply failing to act in any 
meaningful way. Surely an understanding of the science would lead to a 
forming of the evaluative beliefs such that one would fear the consequences of 
failing to act to mitigate climate change and thus take action to absent that 
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fearli. Yet fear it seems is lacking. Now, there is one point worth raising here 
and that is that fear, like many emotions, can often lead to a form of paralysis 
and this could be what is happening, but our suggestion to follow will meet 
this point also. For now what we wish to highlight is that the threat posed by 
AGW is one we need to feel in an emotionally engaged way if we are to be 
motivated to act rationally to mitigate it before it is too late. 
 So, our problem is this:  
1. If we’re Jamesians, then we sit and wait, because until there are the 
environmental triggers to initiate our physiological response to AGW 
we will not be in a position to acknowledge the threat in an 
emotionally engaged way (one might say in the Cavellian sense of the 
term, ‘acknowledgement’, as must acknowledge one another, and not 
merely ‘know’ (about) one another) and thus will not be motivated to 
act until it is likely too late to avert catastrophe. 
2. If we are cognitivists, then we seem to have no way of accounting for 
the current inaction: the ingredients are there for us to form the 
requisite evaluative beliefs but they either remain unformed or they are 
formed in a peculiarly detached and unemotional way. 
The problem we suggest is the problem of diffuse objects. Our 
emotional/psychological makeup as human beings seems prejudiced in 
favour of simple objects with which we are directly acquainted. The threat 
posed by AGW, though no less real, is something akin to a threat that we 
might characterise as having a complex diffuse object. Does this mean, as 
many have argued, that cognitivism is wrong, and that we must give our 
selves up to the truth in Jamesian approaches to these matters. As we noted, 
doing so would be to simply sit and wait for an environmental trigger. Thus, 
probably, to merely wait for our predictable doom. 
 
Conclusion: ‘World-taking cognitivism’ 
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 There is a true middle way here (Not the bet-hedging middle-
ground—which does not therapeutically reconceive the terrain—of ‘hybrid’ 
cognitivism, which still thinks in terms of propositional beliefs). One might 
invoke a more nuanced, methodologically-radical version of cognitivism: 
What one of us has dubbed ‘World-Taking Cognitivism’ (see Hutchinson 2008 
for a full treatment).  
World-taking cognitivism is offered both as a possible framework for 
understanding and as itself directly a therapeutic device. It is a pragmatic 
strategy for aiding us to overcome tensions in our thinking about certain 
matters. The idea is that emotions are ‘world-taking’ to the extent that, to a 
large degree, they are answerable to the way the meaningful world is. In this 
sense this framework enables one to see that, contra James, emotions are 
cognitive to the extent that they are not truly characterised as passive: 
something that afflicts the being. For our emotions are neither truly passive 
(affective, James) nor plainly chosen by us (judgements, Solomon and Sartre), 
nor even some blended combination of the two. Emotions are ways of reading 
and of taking (grasping) the world; more precisely they are ways in which we 
acknowledge loci of significance in the world. Our taking of the world is 
enabled through our conceptual capacities: our second nature. Thus given our 
nature, our Bildung, the loci of significance bear in and down on us. We are 
both answerable for our emotions and subject to them.  
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Important proviso: The term cognitivism/cognitivist is employed here 
in the way in which it is so in metaethics and thus does not imply any appeal 
to ‘the cognitive sciences’. The term is not used, therefore, to denote the 
existence of cognitive processes. This is how we as Wittgensteinians are 
comfortable to speak of an -ism, and a Cognitivism at that, that we endorse; 
whereas obviously much of what ‘Cognitive Science’ calls ‘Cognitivism’, we 
would reject.lii 
Thus none of this amounts to the advancement of a philosophical 
theory of emotion. “World-taking cognitivism” is merely a suggestion as to a 
pragmatic way of seeing our relationship to our world and to others through 
a reflection upon our conceptual capacities and the internal relations holding 
between concepts, on occasions of use. 
Let us elaborate this final remark. Identifying the relations holding 
between concepts, such as those between fear and threat, is not to propound a 
theory. It is to describe how the grasping of one concept might need to carry 
with it, in a particular context, another. That is to say, grasping fear entails, on 
some occasions, in some contexts, also having grasped the concept of threat, 
maybe the concepts of vulnerability, fragility, &c. . Invoking concepts as 
internally related is simply a perspicuous way of noting, describing, the 
nature of our conceptual capacities. Let us take another example: Saying of 
someone that they have grasped the concept of ‘fire’ entails that we predicate 
of them that they have also grasped the concepts of, say, ‘heat’ and of 
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‘burning’. For a person who employed the word ‘fire’ while unable to 
demonstrate that they knew that fire burns and that fire generates heat would 
just not be able to make standard linguistic moves with the word ‘fire’; in the 
absence of a grasp of the concepts of ‘heat’ and of ‘burning’ a person is not 
correctly described as having grasped the concept of ‘fire’.liii Again, we here 
merely invoke the truism that goes somewhat grandiosely by the name of the 
identity theory of truth. One has grasped the concept of fire if and only if one 
has in fact grasped the concept of fire. Not knowing that fire is hot, that fire 
burns, is to fall short of fulfilling one side of the equation; thus one has failed 
to grasp the concept. 
Now, one can employ the word ‘fire’ in some contexts and on some 
occasions whereby the internal relation between it and, say, ‘heat’ does not 
hold, to the extent that the relation is not active on that occasion of use. One 
significant difference between a concept such as ‘fire’ and one such as ‘fear’ is 
the level of cultural specificity demanded, the number of concepts with which 
it can be internally related and the level of occasion sensitivity demanded for 
the internal relations to hold or be active. The internal relations that might 
hold on an occasion between ‘fear’ and other concepts such as ‘threat’, 
‘anxiety’, ‘human needs’, ‘hope’, ‘pain’, ‘love’, do so only given a (greater) 
degree of cultural specificity: a specificity regarding the enculturation of the 
expresser of fear: the afraid person. The cultural specificity demanded by fear 
is much less than that demanded by an emotion such as shame, but it is still 
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something that can operate at the cultural level, or in response to a 
meaningful world, and not merely at the brute causal level (See Hutchinson 
2008, chapters 3 and 4). 
To return us to our problem. What is required to motivate action is an 
engaged acknowledgement of the problem we face. The problem, of how to 
stop the planet burning—in being complex and diffuse—seems to fall short of 
bringing about such a response, and both (standard) cognitivist accounts of 
emotion and Jamesian empiricist accounts do not help us to understand and 
effect the required change. ‘World-Taking Cognitivism’ helps in the sense in 
which it rejects the Jamesian implication that emotions are passive (essentially 
affective) while also providing a way of understanding how they might be 
responses to a meaningful world without inferring from that that they are 
chosen. 
What might this do for us in practical terms? Well it might tell us how 
best to frame the way in which we communicate the threat, so that it brings 
about the integrated engaged response we require (And here one might 
return to the discussion begun in the “Everyday environmentalists” section, 
above). It might show us the kind of cultural pre-requisites for individuals 
being in a position whereby and wherein they acknowledge the threat (And 
now one can see more clearly how and why Williams and Parkman’s 
approach is in the end clearly inadequate; for they have not engaged in such 
reflection or in such cultural examination.) 
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Let us draw an analogy with the notion of prejudice. We noted above 
that there seems to be a prejudice built into us whereby complex diffuse 
objects (e.g. threats that are not before us and which are a concatenation of 
different smaller non-fear-invoking-threats spread over time but ultimately 
comprising a threat of huge magnitude) do not seem to bring about our 
acknowledgement of them as threats in the engaged emotionally-integrated 
manner that would bring about fear and motivate action. What is required 
therefore is not mere stating of the current scientific facts about the AGW, but 
rather a shift in the culture and in our practices, for currently our culture has 
led to a deep seated prejudice (a judgement formed in advance of the facts 
and which remains largely untouched once the facts are in) in favour of 
certain dogmas which mitigate against acknowledgement of the threat and 
mitigating the threat. The dogmas are legion and often mentioned but the 
important point we wish to convey here, as Wittgensteinian-Pragmatists, is 
that what is required are strategies whereby we might collectively be brought to a 
position whereby we acknowledge these deep-seated ways of taking the world as 
contingent ‘pictures’ of the world.liv And thus can we start to midwife the new 
world, one in which our world-takings are healthier, and thus in which we (as 
a species, as one among many) can be sustained, through-and-through 
environed more self-consciously and securely. 
The emotional transition might be one of (first) shame at our realisation 
that we have suppressed our acknowledgement, based on unconscious 
 44 
commitment to these dogmas (the world as disposable resource for human 
use, the world as object (and us as subjects), economic growthism, 
consumerism, materialism, short-termism, liberal individualism and so on) 
and (second) fear as we come to perceive and acknowledge the magnitude of 
the threat.  
Assenting that shame and fear will be a first step away from the abyss, 
and toward true human flourishing. 
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i See Bouveresse for extended discussion of this seeming tension in Wittgenstein’s 
relationship to Freud.  
ii See Stern 2004 and Hutchinson and Read 2005 for more on Wittgenstein’s employment of 
dialogue and dialectic in his therapeutic practice. 
iii It is worthy of note that James is the doyen of empiricists in the philosophy of emotions, 
who often term themselves Jamesians (or Neo-Jamesians). See Hutchinson, Shame and 
Philosophy; and the closing sections of the present paper. 
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iv Hilary Putnam’s work on dissolving the fact-value dichotomy and the reason-emotion 
dichotomy (see especially his 2002) can be helpful here, in making possible Pragmatist-
Wittgensteinianism, rather than just an opposition between classical Pragmatism on the one 
hand and Wittgenstein on the other. 
v Others too are legion, for an indicative sample see n.viii below, and the bibliography of 
Malachowski’s The new Pragmatists. 
vi See his What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories 
vii See the chapters 3 and 4 of Hutchinson, op.cit., for detail. 
viii We are thinking here for instance of PI 293 and 339. There is absolutely no anticipation in James of 
Wittgenstein’s ‘grammatical’ reminders concerning the profound difference between the ‘inner’ and 
the ‘outer’. To the contrary. 
ix See especially our “Towards a perspicuous presentation of ‘perspicuous presentation’”, in 
Philosophical Investigations. 
 
x Wittgenstein and William James, by Russell Goodman. 
 
The Legacy of Wittgenstein: Pragmatism or Deconstruction, edited by Ludwig Nagl and Chantal 
Mouffe. 
 
“Wittgenstein’s philosophy in relation to political thought”, by Alice Crary. 
 
These works by Richard Rorty: 
Philosophy and the mirror of nature 1979 Princeton 
Consequences of Pragmatism 1982 Minneapolis: U. Minnesota Press – especially the first two 
chapters. 
And these works by Hilary Putnam: 
Realism with a Human Face. Edited by James Conant. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1990. 
Renewing Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992. 
Words and Life. Edited by James Conant. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994, 
including see especially Conant’s Introduction. 
Pragmatism: An Open Question. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, especially chapter 2, “Was 
Wittgenstein a Pragmatist?”. 
The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2002. 
“What Is Pragmatism?” With Richard Rorty and James Conant. Think: Philosophy for 
Everyone 8 (Autumn 2004): 71-88. 
xi See e.g. Hutchinson and Read (2010). 
xii See e.g. Tractatus 4.112, and Hutchinson and Read (forthcoming). 
xiii See e.g. p.103 of Wittgenstein’s (1975). 
xiv We are here drawing upon and extending the following famous statement of Peirce’s, 
concerning: “Bain's definition of belief, as "that upon which a man is prepared to act." From 
this definition, pragmatism is scarce more than a corollary; so that I am disposed to think of 
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him [Bain] as the grandfather of pragmatism.” For the full source and a detailed treatment, 
see e.g. http://www.jstor.org/pss/3750480  
xv See e.g. Dewey’s (1933). Peirce and Dewey argued powerfully that certainty is simply not 
required for - and is in a certain important sense irrelevant to – knowledge. Wittgenstein’s On 
Certainty can be seen as close indeed to this vein of Pragmatist thought. 
xvi  Or at least, by trying and failing, or alternatively: by setting out why such failure is (some 
might hold) inevitable). 
xvii For all his own innovativeness and brilliance, Rorty himself was the first to acknowledge, 
modestly, that Putnam, rather than he (Rorty) himself, deserved this laurel. (Lectures heard 
by and personal communications with Rupert Read.) 
xviii It will, we trust, not overly surprise the reader to learn that we do not have in mind under 
the heading ‘showing’ here the fake-showing – a showing which is actually merely disguised-
saying – that has until recently dominated interpretation of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy. 
Rather, what we have in mind is showing that is forever best showing. That isn’t a stand-in 
for something true but unsayable resting immediately behind it. What is shown in our paper 
is what the arrangement that our paper effects shows, no more and no less. No more would 
we demand that a good poem must covertly say what it shows and should be translatable 
into that ‘message’, nor that a visual work of art (e.g. a picture that is not merely another way 
of saying some words) could or should be similarly translatable. And here a key remark of 
Wittgenstein’s is this: “Philosophy ought really to be written as a kind of poetry” (1980; p.24; 
translation emended for idiomaticity). 
xix By Jerry Williams and Shaun Parkman (2003). We will not dwell here on some more 
obvious shortcomings of their paper, such as its (at times) cod sociobiologism. We are trying 
here to draw from it what is worthwhile, and thus taking its glass to be half-full, so as to 
develop out of the useful points and issues that it starts to raise a more fully adequate 
Pragmatist-Wittgensteinian rendition of the same terrain. 
xx This term comes from Warren Goldfarb, in explicating the ‘New Wittgensteinian’ rendition 
of the Tractatus etc.. It can also be found in Wittgenstein himself, most notably in The Voices of 
Wittgenstein. 
xxi It is perhaps important to point out in passing that the term ‘idealism’ here is to be heard as close to 
the use of that term in Marx. That is, the criticism is not of the idea that it is a good thing to be 
idealistic (provided that one is also profoundly realistic, and not in denial about material 
considerations); without at least some idealism in that sense, there is no basis for or enthusiasm for 
change. Nor is the criticism directly of ‘Idealism’ in the sense of the metaphysical system (of Fichte, 
Bradley, etc) commonly opposed to ‘Realism’ – though again there is a connection (for after all, Hegel 
too was an Idealist in this sense; and Idealists are very prone to over-emphasising the importance of 
mind, as opposed to that of world/body). Rather, the worry about ‘idealism’ being raised here is that it 
gives false hope, and can distract attention from the material (and pragmatic) considerations that are 
likely to govern success or failure. 
xxii See for instance Ted Trainer, The Conserver Society (1995). 
xxiii Consider this moving story of how this is possible, how the spirit of ‘Everyone is downstream’ can 
come to be lived: “Son after I had arrived in Ladakh, I was washing some clothes in a stream. Just as I 
was plunging a dirty dress into the water, a little girl, no more than seven years old, came by from a 
village upstream. “You can’t put your clothes in that water”, she said shyly. “People down there have 
to drink it”. She pointed to a village at least a mile further downstream. “You can use that one over 
there, that’s just for irrigation.” This is from Helena Norberg-Hodge’s remarkable and perhaps-
prophetic book, Ancient Futures: Learning from Ladakh (London: Rider, 2000 (1991), p.24; and see 
the revisioning of the term ‘frugality’ on the subsequent pages. 
xxiv Cf. PI section 116. Cf. also the approach taken by Read in chapter 6 of his 2007b; and his 
Handbook on ‘green’ reframing (in preparation). 
xxv Cf. once more n.xxi, above. 
xxvi It might be objected at this point that philosophy “leaves everything as it is” (PI 124) – isn’t 
Wittgenstein a ‘quietist’? Isn’t it quite hopeless to use him for radical political ends? But this 
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is based on a misunderstanding of PI 124 in particular, and of Wittgenstein’s philosophy in 
general. See Read’s (2002) account of how Wittgenstein is quite compatible with and in fact a 
natural companion to radical political change. 
xxvii For some examples of this, see for instance Tom Crompton’s work, such as 
http://www.wwf.org.uk/research_centre/research_centre_results.cfm?uNewsID=2224 . See 
also http://greenwordsworkshop.org/, and especially Read’s contribution at 
http://greenwordsworkshop.org/node/7 . See also Andrew Light and Eric Katz (eds.), 
Environmental Pragmatism (London: Routledge, 1996).  
For a primer on ‘ecologism’ as the ‘ideology’ which such thinking adds up to, see Andrew 
Dobson’s Green political thought. 
xxviii This term is owed to Jerry Katz – see the Introduction to his (1990). ‘Deflationary 
naturalism’ is not really an ‘ism’ at all, in the sense that it is simply non-supernaturalism. 
xxix For Dewey’s use of this term to describe himself, see p.20 of his Experience and Nature 
(1925). For this term as describing Wittgenstein, see p.240 of Baker and Hacker (1985). Cf. also 
the entire argument of Read’s 2004. 
xxx Read’s (2004) argument does not go as far as we now would. We (now) believe that weak 
anthropocentrism must dissolve entirely into ‘Deep ecology’. For, even if one’s ‘main 
concern’ is human beings, and even if one does succeed in not taking up an adversarial stance 
toward the planet through a fantasised alienation from it (and does not recoil into a 
biocentrism that tacitly excludes humans), then one will not be pursuing a genuinely sustain-
able approach unless one truly places the ecosystem first. That is to say: to care for future 
generations etc., it is not enough to place society as conceptually prior to the individual, and 
to think like a society. It is not enough, even to place society firmly in its environmental 
context. One has (We have) to think like an ecosystem. The only way in which we can have a 
society that can be sustained is to pursue the flourishing of the ecosystem in which the society 
is nested (and which it co-constitutes). A viable anthropocentrism of necessity coincides with 
a strong ecologism, which intrinsically values nature (including but not restricted to 
ourselves). 
xxxi The scare-quotes are advised. See Read’s (2007a). 
xxxii See Chapter 1 of Read’s (2007b). 
xxxiii For argument against the widespread misunderstanding of PI 124 as committing Wittgenstein to 
political / ideological ‘neutrality’ in his philosophy, see once more Read’s 2002; cf. n.xxvi, above. 
xxxiv See his The American evasion of philosophy. See Read’s 
http://www.rupertread.fastmail.co.uk/Critical%20Notice%20of%20Cornel%20West to avoid 
being confused by the provocative title of this book. 
xxxv See e.g. the early chapters of Reconstruction in Philosophy (1919). 
xxxvi Cf. here Williams’s and Parkman’s valid criticisms of Ulrich Beck, at p.457. 
xxxvii See the account of William James in Stephens’s (2009), which is directly salient to this 
point: “William James’s radical empiricism and pragmatism constitutes a philosophy that can 
reconcile the split between intrinsic value theorists…and pragmatists who have favored a 
more direct emphasis on environmental policy and application.” (p.228) Stephens’s paper 
helps to dissolve the apparent clash between the need for radical change and the danger of 
drift toward compromise inevitably present in the concept of ‘environmental pragmatism’ 
due to Andrew Smith et al. It is crucial, of course, in all of this, not to fall into the crude 
misreading of Pragmatism (as a philosophical stance) as necessarily involving (excessive) 
compromise or an abandonment of principle. 
xxxviii Cf. Wittgenstein’s "A philosopher is a man who has to cure many intellectual diseases in 
himself before he can arrive at the notions of common sense" (CV 44), and cf. also PI 129: “The 
aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and 
familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—because it is always before one’s eyes.)”. 
Somewhat similarly, James, the philosopher who Wittgenstein cites in his nachlass more than 
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any other, discussed with great subtlety and poignancy the sentimentalist fallacy of 
professing deep concern for abstract justice while being blind to concrete injustice in front of 
one’s eyes in his Pragmatism lectures, and also in the Principles of Psychology. 
xxxix See for instance Issue 5 of Turbulence: http://turbulence.org.uk/ 
xl Again, a small beginning in this direction is made by Read, in his Philosophy for life: 
Applying Philosophy in politics and culture (London: Continuum, 2007). 
xli See e.g. George Lakoff’s work 
xlii See for instance the Transition Movement. 
xliii And here is a great confluence with Wittgenstein, whose remark that philosophical 
problems are really problems of the will, not of the intellect, is nothing if not Jamesian. What 
is needed is a Jamesian (one might also call it a Pascalian, or Kierkegaardian) step of faith in 
our ability to act together successfully to change our common future into a liveable one. 
Without such faith, such willed-belief, our mutual destruction is assured. 
xliv As explicated in our Wittgenstein-inspired book, There is no such thing as a social science, this 
is at the root of the fundamental misconception of human activity in ‘social science’ as 
predictable and delimitable. For knowledge of what is ‘humanly impossible’ can act as a 
stimulus to make it possible, or as a self-fulfilling prophecy (i.e. such ‘knowledge’ can depress 
us into its being true). It is ‘objectively impossible’ to know where human society is going, 
because we mutually make it, and such knowledge therefore would be self-refuting.  
xlv For a lovely account of James as the apogee of this philosophical revolution, see Sydney 
Morgenbesser’s remarks, at p.88 of Bryan Magee’s The great philosophers. For Wittgenstein’s 
shift to seeing the agent, the person, as the fundamental unit, rather than theory or anything 
like it, see our accounts of philosophical therapy as person-relative, in our (Forthcoming) and 
our (2010). 
xlvi Also worth comparing here is Ethnomethodology, the revolutionary ‘agent-centred’ 
version of or replacement for sociology that takes society seriously but prescinds from any 
‘expert’ theorisation’ thereof (expert for that of the native experts, such as coroners, 
magistrates, etc). Cf. e.g. chapter 3 of our There is no such thing as a social science. 
Ethnomethodology has been inspired primarily by Schutz, Merleau-Ponty - and Wittgenstein. 
(For a useful effort to show the significant affinities between Pragmatism and 
Ethnomethodology, see also Emirbayer, M. and Maynard, D. W. , 2006-08-11 "Pragmatism 
and Ethnomethodology" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological 
Association, Montreal Convention Center, Montreal, Quebec, Canada Online <PDF>. 2009-05-24 
from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p95497_index.html ). 
xlvii See Hutchinson 2008 “Emotions-Philosophy-Science”, in Gustafsson, Kronkvist and 
McEachrane (eds).  
xlviii There is much debate over the most appropriate term for this group of theorists, for an 
overview see Hutchinson 2008. 
xlix See, for example, Prinz 2003b: 5 and Solomon 2003a: 12. 
l It’s telling to note, given the widely-held assumption that Wittgenstein was an anti-Jamesian 
proto-cognitivist (see, for example, Griffiths (1997) account of the emergence of cognitivism in 
Kenny’s Action, Emotion & Will) that Wittgenstein would find neither of the options presented 
by James to be satisfactory. Both options, as presented in the quote from James, suggest or 
imply a mind-body dualism. A truly Wittgensteinian (dis-)solution, compatible we suggest 
with the best of the spirit of Pragmatism (with for instance the Jamesian right-to-believe; the 
Deweyan emphases on human animals as through-and-through environed, as through-and-
through not subjects facing objects, as through-and-through not in need of a quest for 
certainty conceived of as knowledge-immune-to-doubt; the Peircean suggestion that belief is 
not really belief unless it be articulated into action (so long as this is not a tacit behavioristic 
claim, but rather a kind of moral or political one: on what basis are you (and are you not) 
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prepared to act?); and so forth), is in another dimension, eventuating in what we shall collect 
under the heading of ‘world-taking cognitivism’. 
li Of course, one typical fear response, is flight (fleeing the threat). This is simply not an option 
in this context. It seems the option left to us is to fight, which would in this context entail 
forgoing certain luxuries to which we have become accustomed so as to bring about the 
change required to mitigate the threat. That is correct: but it doesn’t usually feel like fighting 
(‘the climate war’). This is where (for instance) reframing and the normalisation of new 
practices come in. 
lii For such rejection, see for instance the March 2008 (25:2) special issue of Theory, Culture and 
Society on (criticisms of) Cognitivism. 
liii Cf. On Certainty sections 472-4. 
liv If Wittgenstein is a quietist, and if Pragmatism is an apologia for the status quo with minor 
mods, then they cannot help us. But if Wittgensteinian-Pragmatist thinking leads into a 
practice that takes practice seriously and that helps us take the world in accord with our 
nature as embodied emotional dependent and interdependent social animals, and helps us 
resist the allures of taking the world down with us by refusing our nature, as most 
philosophies hitherto have, then it can signpost the way. (For more on our nature in a broadly 
Wittgenstein/Pragmatist light, see once more Dewey’s Experience and Nature, and Alisdair 
MacIntyre’s Dependent rational animals.) 
 
